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Who Should Pay for Interdependent Risk? Policy
Implications for Security Interdependence Among Airports
Gabriel Kuper ,1 Fabio Massacci ,1,∗ Woohyun Shim,2 and Julian Williams3
We study interdependent risks in security, and shed light on the economic and policy implica-
tions of increasing security interdependence in presence of reactive attackers. We investigate
the impact of potential public policy arrangements on the security of a group of interdepen-
dent organizations, namely, airports. Focusing on security expenditures and costs to society,
as assessed by a social planner, to individual airports and to attackers, we first develop a
game-theoretic framework, and derive explicit Nash equilibrium and socially optimal solu-
tions in the airports network. We then conduct numerical experiments mirroring real-world
cyber scenarios, to assess how a change in interdependence impact the airports’ security ex-
penditures, the overall expected costs to society, and the fairness of security financing. Our
study provides insights on the economic and policy implications for the United States, Eu-
rope, and Asia.
KEY WORDS: Airports; cybersecurity; game theory; interdependent risk; security
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent initiatives introduced by the Single Eu-
ropean Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)
and the U.S. Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) have mandated an increased
use of integrated information and communications
technology (ICT) in Air Traffic Management. An
inherent requirement of these initiatives is a tightly
integrated and interlinked airport information
network resulting in an increased security interde-
pendence among airports. A clear consequence from
the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Administrator M. Huerta’s own words in 2011 is that
“With that evolution [NextGen] the cyber security
risks will increase.”
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Cyber-physical network dependency, for which
aviation is a prime archetype, is a key problem,
both literally in the sense of information networks
and more generically in the sense of interconnected
digital and physical services (Ganin et al., 2020; Gis-
ladottir, Ganin, Keisler, Kepner, & Linkov, 2017).
This article introduces a simple, but rich, model
of interconnected risks. The model has an explicit
and an implicit mechanism which generate inter-
dependencies between network nodes (in this case,
individual airports). The explicit mechanism assumes
positive externalities between nodes (individual
airports) that are generated by the degree of inter-
connectedness. Security expenditures of connected
nodes can decrease the probability of attack of a
target along the model of the Heal and Kunreuther
analysis of interconnected airports (Heal & Kun-
reuther, 2007). For example, interconnectedness can
be proportional to routed traffic connections so that
interdependency is empirically and monotonically
related to the underlying degree of activity connect-
ing the airports, based around a measure of traffic,
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a route we pursue in this article for a simulation
of our results. A second, implicit mechanism is due
to the activities of attackers that is determined by
the underlying attractiveness of airports as targets.
The first type of dependency has been suggested,
with varying degrees of complexity, in several
prior studies (Hausken & He, 2016; Paté-Cornell,
Kuypers, Smith, & Keller, 2018; Shafieezadeh, Cha,
& Ellingwood, 2015). The second type, and the
interaction with attacking intensity operating across
the network permits the analysis of the effect of
different policies on security. In this instance, our
interest is in the fairness of the allocation of funding
through passenger taxation schemes.
From the viewpoint of a reduction in the possi-
bility of an adverse event air security can reasonably
be modeled as superadditive in nature, by construc-
tion. That is, the joint contribution to security of
individual actions is greater than the simple sum of
the individual parts. Furthermore, this superadditive
security risk reduction is transversal, that is, the
endowment of security is distributed across indi-
vidual airports. This combination of effects is often
referred to as a positive network-externality. Several
prior studies have either directly or tangentially
addressed this type of externality in the security
context (Chopra & Khanna, 2015; Haphuriwat &
Bier, 2011; Insua, Cano, Pellot, & Ortega, 2016;
Zhang, Ramirez-Marquez, & Wang, 2015).
In the airport domain, cyber-threats are not
often separate from physical ones.4 Risks arise from
the interaction of vulnerability, threat-actor (we
use the catch-all phrase “attacker”) and individual
plus joint threat mitigation efforts. Cyber attacks in
conjunction with physical attacks may be used to
increase potency or simply to be the core focus of an
effort to exploit cyber to physical effects (Hausken,
2019; Zhuang, Bier, & Gupta, 2007), for instance
by malicious attacks on Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition systems (SCADA) or other critical
equipment; or embarrass commercial entities and act
as a conduit for a political message (Hausken, 2017;
Nganje, Bier, Han, & Zack, 2008; Wu, Tang, & Wu,
2015).
4The Association of Airport Directors (Airport Council Inter-
national, 2014) have broadly classified cyber-threats into three
groups. The first one concerns subvertible systems, such as oper-
ationally critical networks, baggage systems, and web pages. The
second group includes directly theft and fraud resulting in direct
financial losses for airlines, onsite vendors, passengers, employ-
ees, and contractors. The final group includes all attacks related
to terrorism.
If security threats increase, more security coun-
termeasures need to be deployed to mitigate risk. An
important policy question is how these mitigation
measures are to be financed. At present, average
security costs by airport account for approximately
35% of overall airport operating costs, and are
financed using a variety of mechanisms. For exam-
ple, in the United States, security costs are partly
funded through direct taxes (a flat rate tax of $5.6
per passenger/flight segment), and mostly from the
Federal Government (Gulliver, 2014). In Europe,
there is a larger variety of models (Falconer, 2008;
Irish Aviation Authority & Aviasolutions, 2004).
Some countries (e.g., Finland, Germany, Italy, and
Switzerland) follow a centralized financing model
(states collect taxes centrally and redistribute them
to airports for funding security costs), other countries
(such as Belgium, Denmark, France, and the United
Kingdom) follow a decentralized model, where
security is the responsibility of the airport; under the
supervision of a central authority, airports directly
pay for security through charges imposed on passen-
gers. Yet, whether collected from the airport or from
the state, the final outcome is a flat rate levied on
a per-passenger basis (Irish Aviation Authority &
Aviasolutions, 2004) ranging from €5 to €7. This levy,
as in the U.S. model, is, unfortunately, hardly enough
to cover the costs: “In 12 of the 13 [European] States
with operating deficits [ . . . ], the airports fund the
major proportion of the deficit” (Irish Aviation
Authority & Aviasolutions, 2004, p. 48).
One of the notable results is that even though
mandated security expenditures minimize the total
expected costs to society from an attack under the
current security financing scheme, the distribution
of security expenditures for airports of different
natures would be unfair. This study also shows that
the new ICT-based operational initiatives that affect
interdependence among airports might be beneficial
to small airports, as they can reduce an unfair burden
of security expenditures.
2. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Conceptually, our baseline assumptions on
the structure of dependency follow the canonical
definitions put forward in the survey by Hausken
and Levitin (2012): “Systems where an impact on one
element gets transferred further to one or several other
elements due to linkages”(Hausken & Levitin, 2012,
p. 356). Among the several type of systems described
in the survey (single elements, network, etc.), the
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interdependent systems subsume the network and the
multiple elements as it makes explicit the effects of
linkages.
Methodologically, there are a number of model-
ing approaches that can be deployed to achieve this
conceptual framing. Prior research has focused on
three main approaches: first, agent-based simulation
(ABS) models that impose a detailed structure on
security interactions, but often rely on quite ad
hoc statistical premises; second, input–output (IO)
models, usually entailing simpler discrete event sim-
ulations than full agent-based models that focus on
key relationships between objects within the scope
of the simulation; finally, partial equilibrium models
where an individual agents’ actions are modeled in
response to statistical summaries of the rest of the
system. We shall look at the pros and cons of each
technique, before explaining how our framework sits
within the current set of canonical models.
The objectives of ABS models are mainly to
investigate large-scale complex interactions, and
address issues caused by interdependence in the
network. ABS models focus on investigating the
decision processes and action strategies of various
agents in interdependent infrastructure systems. For
example, North (2001), Macal and North (2002),
and Veselka et al. (2002) study behavior, strategies
and decisions of interdependent infrastructure
agents, and model interactions among them. In each
case, an ABS model is used to demonstrate how
interdependent infrastructures respond to changes
in market conditions and disruptions. Further work
in Barton, Edison, Schoenwald, Cox, and Reinert
(2007) and Brown, Beyeler, and Barton (2004) also
develop ABS tools that explore how interdepen-
dence impacts network and market performance in
the case of large-scale disruption or policy changes
on interdependent infrastructure networks, and how
individual agents react to these events.
While ABS models capture system struc-
ture quite accurately, their very complexity poses
problems. The stochastic properties of individual
components often have to be specified through
informed guesses on the capabilities of attackers
and defenders to change the outcome likelihood
of success or failure of an attack. Dependency is
often mechanically imposed and the transfer of in-
formation can be significantly affected by modeling
decisions driven by intuition rather than by data. To
overcome some of these issues, several approaches
inherit some of the structure of ABS models, but
impose certain simplifying structures to permit
easier parameterization from experimental data.
For instance, Haimes and Jiang (2001) introduced
Leontief-based IO models to analyze the impact of a
disruption on interdependent infrastructure systems.
Here, the interrelations are linear, and hence the
coefficients of the model are those that determine
the input and output vector, subject to certain
plausible structural restrictions. Further models
proposed by Jiang and Haimes (2004), Santos and
Haimes (2004), Santos (2006), and Leung, Haimes,
and Santos (2007) increase the degree of complexity
within the model (e.g., by increasing the size of
input and output vectors), to reveal more complex
interactions. However, due to the limitations of
traditional Leontief-based models (e.g., linearity,
lack of behavioral content, and lack of consideration
of network structure), more recent studies including
Zhang and Peeta (2011, 2014) and Resurreccion and
Santos (2013) have proposed models incorporating
more features such as multiperiod dynamics and
nonlinear interactions.
Another area related to our study is the work
in security economics. While many of the studies
in this field also take into account a perspective of
interdependence, they develop a separate spectrum
of discussion on the interdependence in the security
context. Specifically, these studies explore not only
interdependence among economic actors, but also
the interaction between the economic actors and
adversaries attacking the systems. For example,
Florêncio and Herley (2013), Cremonini and Nizovt-
sev (2009), Fultz and Grossklags (2009), Ioannidis,
Pym, and Williams (2013) study the interactions
between attackers and defenders in an interdepen-
dent security setting. Zhuang et al. (2007) and more
recently Hausken (2017) have studied interdepen-
dence in the framework of supply chains including
transportation along the lines of McLay, Jacobson,
and Kobza (2008). See, in particular, the work of
Hausken (2017) for a comprehensive discussion
on the limitations of the previous literature in the
treatment of interdependence. A key observation is
that the previous literature has often assumed that
defenses and attacks against one target are also
effective against another target, depending on an
interdependence parameter. In other words, if a
target is attacked, the other ones also suffer from
it. Modern approaches, including our own article,
conceptualized interdependence in such a way
that if one target fails, other targets fail with a
certain probability controlled by interdependence
parameters linking each pair of targets. Those
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parameters might, in their turn, depend on the
other targets’ security expenditures. However,
some modeling assumptions are still appropriate
and we also use them in this article. For example,
Zhuang et al. (2007) represent interdependence
as the probability that an attack on agent i infects
an agent j but assume a constant interdependence
coefficient for technical aspects in their simulation.
We complement it with the amount of traffic among
the interconnected airports so that it can vary for
different pairs of i and j (see further in Section 6).
In these cases, specific agents are modeled, or
grouped together, such that their actions are consid-
ered to be identical in expectations. For example,
deriving attacker production functions when the
actions and opportunity sets of targets is presumed
to be a simple stochastic process. Or vice versa,
viewing attackers as random actors with no general
strategic goals and modeling defensive investment
with and without some form of coordinating regula-
tion (see the cited survey Hausken & Levitin, 2012,
for a comparison of different classification of attacks
and defense measures). Indeed, tractable models of
security investment are often preferred for practical
insight. For example, Gillen and Morrison (2015) use
a simple discounted cash-flow approach to establish
a cost-benefit criteria for managing terrorism risk
(primarily) in air transport.
3. REGULATION, FINANCING, AND
OPERATION OF AIRPORT SECURITY
In the United States, air transport security
is mostly regulated at the federal level (by the
Transport Security Administration, TSA) with some
ground installation regulation occurring at the state
level. In contrast, within the European Union (Irish
Aviation Authority & Aviasolutions, 2004), Euro-
pean Economic Area and the European Free Trade
Association, security is primarily a member action
with coordination of standards set by the European
Commission.5 One of the main objectives of the EU
approach to regulation has been to make aviation se-
curity regulation more flexible and up-to-date against
innovation in attacker technologies. An example
of an explicit physical interdependence embedded
in regulation is the concept of “one-stop security”
which sets out rescreening procedures for transfer
5Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002) and Regulation (EC) No.
300/2008 setting the harmonization of standards in civil aviation
security were further advanced by revising and elaborating.
Table I. Examples of “Traditional” Security Measures in
Airports from Graham et al. (2013, table 5.4)
Protection Measure
1. Badge regime and reliability check on badge applicants.
2. Checks on access to restricted areas and video supervision.
3. Checks on passengers and hand baggage.
4. Baggage reconciliation and checks on hold baggage.
5. Checks on cargo/airmail.
6. Armed protection land-side and airside.
7. Protection of parked aircraft.
passengers arriving from non-EU countries (Fal-
coner, 2008). Table I provides an example of the typ-
ical security requirements from current regulations.
Asia has a diverse regulatory approach. For
example, airports in Australia (InterVISTAS Inc.,
2018; Tourism & Transport Forum, 2015), South Ko-
rea (Han Young Yoon, & So, 2011), and Singapore
(IATA, 2005, 2009; Kandiah, 2004) tend to use
the privately operated and government regulated
model. In contrast, many airports in China (Kandiah,
2004; LeighFisher Ltd., 2013), Hong Kong (IATA,
2005), and India (Kandiah, 2004; Singh, Dalei, &
Raju, 2015) are still owned by the government and
depend on the centralized model. See also Gillen
and Morrison for a comprehensive survey of severa
countries (Gillen & Morrison, 2015).
From the attacker’s perspective, there is also a
coordinated set of risk assessments that are typically
published for European airports by Eurocontrol,
see the “Eurocontrol-manual” (Eurocontrol, 2010).
In Table II, we have extracted a snippet of the
likelihood classifications for successful attacks
against airports and the required controls to reduce
exposures. Similar tables are used in SESAR’s work
package (WP) 16, that manages the risk assessment
for SESAR’s operational concepts.
ACI Europe (the airports association) argues
that governments should fund civil aviation security
centrally, since terrorists commonly target states
rather than a specific airport, which are selected as a
function of profile and likelihood of success.
Furthermore, there is an incentive problem
whereby competition and asymmetric passenger
number growth might distort individual airport secu-
rity investment, see, for instance, ACI Europe (2003,
2009, 2010) for survey evidence on these effects. Fur-
thermore, according to commissioned research from
Aviasolutions for the Irish Aviation Authority (Irish
Aviation Authority & Aviasolutions, 2004), there
have been inconsistent security funding mechanisms
Who Should Pay For Interdependent Risk? 5
Table II. Likelihood of a Successful Attack (From Eurocontrol ATM Risk Toolkit)
Likelihood Physical People Electronic
High Physical access possible No control or prerequisite engineering
knowledge
Normal function or known vulnerability
Medium Physical barriers in depth Access control, staff checking & training Well isolated & access controlled
Low Protection, inspection & audit Include separation polices & audit Segregated networks and regular monitoring
Table III. Structure of Airport Security Provisions
Funding and Provision Model Centralized Model Decentralized Model
Provision of security activities Austria, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA,
China, India
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece,
Ireland, UK, South Korea, Australia,
Singapore
Countries charging state security
taxes





Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany,
Netherlands, India
Belgium, France, Greece, Iceland, UK,
South Korea, Australia, Singapore
Table IV. Traffic Information on Sample Airports
Traffic Volume Passengers/Day Coming from
Airport Pass/Year Flights/Day Pass/Day Large Medium Small
Large (Munich, DE) 37.7M 680 101.370 18.182 48.205 34.983
Medium (Verona, IT) 2.7M 222 7.397 3.226 1.467 2.704
Small (Ancona, IT) 0.5M 20 1.479 565 652 262
Note: Munich is the second hub of Lufthansa in Germany, the 7th European Airport and 27th worldwide; Verona is a “feeder airport” for
other national carriers (e.g., Lufthansa to Munich, Alitalia to Rome, etc.) and some low-cost airlines; Ancona’s airport is only served by
Lufthansa, the national carrier Alitalia, and three low-cost airlines (e.g., Ryanair).
across various European countries. Table III outlines
the heterogeneity in state security funding ap-
proaches. While the centralized model is a commonly
used system for security financing, many countries
employ a diverse set of funding mechanisms.
Such variety of funding models is coupled with a
wide variety of airport types. In interview with stake-
holders, airport types are commonly distinguished by
their sizes. Large airports are assumed to be airports
working as hubs for medium-small airports, and
medium-small airports are considered to be spoke
airports with relatively low traffic volume. The differ-
ence in scale among them is illustrated in Table IV.
4. MODEL STRUCTURE AND
ASSUMPTIONS
Our model considers strategic interactions
between three classes of actors: multiple attackers,
airports, and a risk-neutral social planner regulator
for all airports. Following Ioannidis et al. (2013) and
the random attack model of Hausken and Levitin
(2012), we assume that targets are strategic and
attackers are reactive. The former follows a Nash
Equilibrium and the latter a Cournot Equilibrium,
and all players move simultaneously.
4.1. General Assumptions about Targets and
Attackers
Table V presents the critical model variables and
parameters for individual agents within the model.
Network models with equilibrium decision making
have been quite extensively studied before, see
Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv
(2010) and Jackson and Zenou (2015) for surveys.
While our game has several unique features in terms
of the structure of the various interdependencies, the
basic decision making per node follows a standard
concave game. Risk reduction is log-linear and
realized costs of implementation are linear in invest-
ment. This ensures that for a series of relatively mild
constraints on parameters, targets have well-defined
optimal security investment choices. Our choice
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Table V. Description of Model Parameters and Decision Variables
Defender/Target
N Number of airports
xi Airport i’s security investment. Endogenous Decision Variable for the ith airport.
αi Airport i’s marginal risk reduction. Parameter dependent on defensive technology.
Ai Airport i’s zero investment risk. Parameter dependent on technology.
Li Airport i’s assets at risk. Environmental parameter.
Policy maker
vi Social planner’s weight for airport i. In a pure utilitarian model, this is an environmental parameter.
δij Degree of security dependency of airport i
on airport j.
Parameter dependent on technology and connectivity.
Attacker
NA Variable number of attackers
η Attacker intensity. Variable derived from NA decisions to attack against N airports.
β Decay factor in repeated trials. Parameter dependent on attacking technology.
ρi Reward/cost ratio for an attack, R/C. Parameter based on the attackers subjective view of cost and
reward given a successful attack on the ith target.
of functional form is driven by the need to have a
tractable equilibrium solution which we will then
exploit in our numerical simulations to establish
the public policy optimum levels of taxation and
risk transfer.
Let i and j index airports such that
i = j ∈ {1, . . . , N} are the indices of each air-
port. The security expenditure made by airport
i is represented by xi and the vector of security
expenditures (x1, . . . , xN) by x. We assume that the
defender and the social planner are optimizers, and
therefore that the strategic interaction follows a
Nash equilibrium under risk neutrality. The secu-
rity investments of the risk-averse players will be
obviously higher than the risk-neutral player and
therefore the effects captured in this article will be
amplified (see Massacci, Swierzbinski, & Williams,
2017 for a discussion of what happens in the case of
cyberinsurance). However, risk neutrality simplifies
the mathematical treatment and allows us to focus
on the study of interdependence rather than the
difference between risk aversion and risk neutrality.
From our cybersecurity perspective, attackers
are assumed to be reactive and identical in nature:
they have the same characteristics for launching an
attack on the cyber-infrastructure of airports. From
the statistical view of the target, airports are attacked
by NA attackers, where the likelihood of an attacker
being matched to any given airport is identical for
all attackers and hence 1/N. If we consider that the
number of potential attackers is arbitrarily high, the
number NA of actual attackers, hereafter expressed
as the number NA of attackers, is endogenously
determined by a potential attacker selecting himself
into attacking or not attacking. Hence, we can con-
sider a single decision variable, the average number
of attacks, denoted as η, on N airports as given
by the ratio η = NA/N, which we refer to as the
attacker intensity. An alternative view is to assume
a fixed number of attackers and that each attacker
attacks with a certain endogenously determined
intensity η.
Since all potential attackers are assumed to be
identical, they have the same cost, C, for launching
an attack. This refers to software attacks, not at-
tacks on the physical infrastructure. Most common
mechanisms of attack are, by construction, mostly
indiscriminate (Bilge & Dumitras, 2012). Hence
our focus is toward untargeted attacks against the
organization, typically supported by automatic tools
responsible for the vast majority of attacks in the
wild (Bilge & Dumitras, 2012). Targeted attacks are
rare events (“Black Swans”) (Nayak, Marino, Efs-
tathopoulos, & Dumitraş, 2014), for which the lack
of foresight understanding of the event’s causes and
dynamics can be better captured by “uncertainty” as
opposed to “probability” (Brown & Cox, 2011; Flage
& Aven, 2015). The only known attack to an airport
(Bristol, see https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-
bristol-45539841) was indeed caused by a generic
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ransomware. This may include the cost of setting
the cyber-infrastructure, the cost of incarceration if
caught, and the opportunity cost of the lost return
from pursuing alternative options (e.g., an attack on
the power grid) (Ioannidis et al., 2013).
While we assume identical attackers in terms
of means, their expected reward from a successful
attack on different airports might differ. This is due
to the fact that attackers might be able to achieve
a far higher reward by successfully striking a large
airport than a small airport. We therefore assume
that the expected reward obtained from a successful
attack depends on the airport attacked, and use Ri as
the reward per attack against airport i when one or
more of these attacks turns out to be successful. We
do not make any assumption on the unit in which
revenues from successful attacks are measured. They
could be kudos in hackers fora (Ooi, Kim, Wang, &
Hui, 2012) or revenues from trading victim’s assets in
black markets (Allodi, Corradin, & Massacci, 2015;
Grier et al., 2012) or number of fatalities (Sandler &
Lapan, 1988).
We define ρi = Ri/C as the reward/cost ratio
against airport i. While ρi inherits its heterogeneity
from Ri , we shall show that from the attacker
assumptions the overall risk associated with the
attacker decision making will be determined, mostly,
by the average value and the structure of the
network. A key issue is to actually assess it from
empirical data. For example, Ooi et al. (2012) do
not report the actual effort required by hackers to
deface websites. However, later in the simulation we
only need to assume that the cost-to-reward ration is
reasonably high (a factor of 2 or 10) as suggested by
the literature.
We use σi to represent the probability that
one or more attacks mounted against airport i
are successful. Consistent with the previous liter-
ature (Ioannidis et al., 2013), this probability σi is
conditional on the strategic decisions of attackers
and airports. Specifically, we let σi = σi (x, η), imply-
ing that σi depends on x and η. We assume that σi
is considered to have the following properties for all
i = j . Assumptions 1–3 are discussed in Gordon and
Loeb (2002) and Ioannidis et al. (2013) and 4 and 5
are natural extensions of these.
Assumption 1. An increase in the security expenditure
of a target decreases the probability of a successful
attack (∂σi/∂xi < 0).
Assumption 2. There are decreasing marginal returns
to security expenditure (∂2σi/∂x2i > 0).
Assumption 3. There is a potential benefit from
another airport’s security expenditure on the target,
hence a direct mechanism of positive externalities of
security expenditure (∂σi/∂xj ≤ 0).
Assumption 4. Marginal effectiveness of positive
externalities decreases as an airport increases its own
security expenditure (∂2σi/∂xi∂xj > 0).
Assumption 5. An increase in the average number of
attacks made against a target increases the probability
of a successful attack (∂σi/∂η > 0).
Assumption 6. Attackers who have chosen to attack
an airport have an equal probability of being matched
to any given target (attacker target matching is at
maximum entropy). An attack on any given airport is
an independent experiment from any other attacks.
4.2. Introducing Interdependence among Targets
The security dependency structure is in two
parts. First, through a direct channel, where in-
vestment has a direct cross product in reducing
the probability of successful attacks when attacker
intensity is fixed. This is similar to the average de-
pendency structure in Kunreuther and Heal (2003)
and Heal and Kunreuther (2003) although we allow
for heterogeneous codependency across the network
of airports, which is presumed to be exponential
affine in structure. To do so, we define the proba-
bility explicitly by selecting some functional forms
which satisfy our general assumptions (Gordon &
Loeb, 2002) (Assumptions 1–6) and have been also
explored in similar forms in the literature (Hausken
& Levitin, 2012). For example, see Gordon and
Loeb (2002), Kunreuther and Heal (2003), or more
recently Hausken (2019).
σbase,i (η) = Ai η
β + η , (1)
σi (x, η) = σbase i (η) exp
⎛





σbase i (η) indicates the baseline probability of a suc-
cessful attack when there is no security investment
and the number of attackers is fixed exogenously at
η. Ai is the probability that an attack on airport i
is successful in the absence of any cybersecurity ex-
penditure by the airport or any spillover in security
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from the network effect. β represents a decay factor6
as not all independent attacks will be successful (see
also the contest parameter (Hausken, 2019)).
From Equation (2), αi is airport i’s marginal re-
duction in risk from additional security expenditure.
δij is the transmission factor that determines how a
marginal effect of a change in investment by airport i
transfer to airport j and hence determines the degree
of security interdependency. The security level of
one airport therefore combines outputs of security
efforts of the other airports as well as the airport
Here, we follow Hausken (2019) so that interde-
pendence is conceptually modeled as a conditional
probability: a target i may fail when target j fails. In
our scenario, δij ≥ 0 means that an increase in the
security expenditures xj have a positive impact on
the security of agent i thus leading to a lower chances
of success for an attack to hit agent i. In the case
of airports, a suitable proxy for the level of interde-
pendency is the passenger traffic between them. We
discuss this issue in more detail in Section 6.
When δij = 1, airports i’s one extra unit of
security expenditure affects airport i to the same
degree as one unit of its own expenditure; when
δij = 0, there is no security interdependence.
As attackers are reactive they will attack if there
is any chance of making a “profit” (in their unit of
measure, see previous discussion), thus eventually
ending in a Cournot Equilibrium. The expected
payoff, 	i,A, from mounting an attack on airport i is
given by
	i,A = σi (x, η)Ri − C. (3)
We consider that the matching of an attack to an air-
port is at maximum entropy, hence the probability of
any attacker who has chosen to attack any airport is
1/N, as such the expected payoff for any given at-
tack, indexed by a, is E[	a] = 1/N
∑N
i=1 	i,A. The
equilibrium total cost CNA versus expected reward∑N
i=1 σi (x, η)Ri when each η, should satisfy:
N∑
i=1
σi (x, η)Ri = CNA. (4)
While the left-hand side of Equation (4) shows an
attacker’s aggregate reward from an attack made
against the whole population of target airports, the
6As η = NA/N then η/(β + η) = NA/(β · N + NA). For the sim-
ulation, we will assume β = 1/N, i.e., almost all attacks will be
successful if no countermeasure is taken.
right-hand side of the equation is an aggregate cost
for all attackers to engage in attacks.
This equation ensures that more attacks will be
launched as long as the expected reward from an
attack (left side of the equation) exceeds the cost
of the attack (right side of the equation) (Ioannidis
et al., 2013). Rewriting Equation (4) and dividing it
by CN determines the equilibrium attacking intensity






σi (x, η)ρi = η. (5)
It should be noted that, in equilibrium, the average
number η of attacks per target satisfying Equation (5)
depends in general on the vector x of security expen-
ditures by the N airports.
We let Li represent the expected loss suffered
by airport i when one or more successful attacks
on the airport occur. Without loss of generality, we
suppose that Li does not depend on the total number
of successful attacks but only on whether there is
a single successful attack. This is appropriate for
airport security, as a severe incident in an airport is
routinely followed by detailed security action and the
vulnerable point that caused the incident is removed.
Therefore, airport i will select its level of security
expenditure xi by minimizing the expected cost
V∗i = minxi [σi (x, η)Li + xi ]. (6)
4.3. Introducing a Social Planner
Assumption 7. We assume that the airport regulator
is a Stackelberg policy maker who seeks to minimize
the total expected cost, calculated by the weighted
average of the individual expected costs (expected loss
from attacks plus investments) of each airport. The
policy is able to individually set minimum investment
levels in security for each airports.
To take into account the regulator in the anal-
ysis, we assume that the regulator sets the vector of
the levels of security expenditures for all airports,
x′, to minimize the weighted average of the airports’
expected costs,
∑N
i=1 vi (σi L
′
i + x′i ), where vi are
positive weights indicating how much importance
the regulator places on airport i and L′i is the loss
appreciated by the policy maker (e.g., fatalities or
reputation). The vector (x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
N) is the social
planer or regulator’s strategic choice variable.
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Normally, regulators treats all airports equally,
or at least claim to do so. For example, interviews
with key stakeholders showed that this is a common
practice of the European Commission (De Gramat-
ica, Massacci, Shim, Tedeschi, & Williams, 2015). So
one could also assign vi = 1.
It is however possible to treat the general
case of vi = 1 by absorbing weights into the losses
and investment by setting Li = vi L′i and xi = vi x′i .
Then one needs only to replace xi with x′i/vi in the
derivations and in the propositions to obtain the
weighted results.
For a social planner regulator, the objective






(σi Li + xi ), (7)
where each airport is effectively weighted by the size
of the loss incurred in the event of a successful attack.
As already mentioned, we restrict our analysis to the
risk-neutral case. See Massacci et al. (2017) for how
security investments are amplified when risk aversion
is considered in the case of cyberinsurance.
5. INTERDEPENDENT SECURITY WITH
STRATEGIC ATTACKERS
We first consider the base case where there
is no security interdependence, hence δij = 0
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Simultaneously, the two sets of
player types choose their equilibrium expenditure
on security investment following Equation (6) and
the number of attackers NA is determined by the
expected cost versus expected reward tradeoff from
Equation (5). The simultaneous Nash equilibrium
is the combination of optimal security investments
x∗i and attacker intensities η
∗ that jointly satisfy the
objectives in Equations (6) and (5).
5.1. Equilibrium in Absence of Direct
Interdependence
Denoting the equilibrium level of attacks per
target as η∗, the first-order condition characterizing




Li = −1. (8)
The second-order condition for optimality is satisfied
implicitly by our assumptions on decreasing marginal
returns for security investments (see Assumptions 2
and 4). By setting δij = 0, reorganizing Equation (8)
with respect to x∗i , and solving this and Equation (5)
simultaneously, we get the following result.
Proposition 1 Nash equilibrium with no direct
security interdependence. When δij = 0, the Nash
equilibrium (x∗, η∗) for airports and attackers can be












Proposition 1 shows that the level of equilibrium
security expenditures in airports is mainly deter-
mined by the marginal loss reduction from additional
security expenditure and the baseline probability
of a successful attack. The equilibrium number of
attackers depends on the ratios between the reward
for an attack on airport i and the marginal effect of
security expenditure on loss reduction, αi Li .
We now consider a case where an airport
regulator seeks to identify the optimal regulatory
intervention for the airports.
Proposition 2 Optimal strategies under regulatory
intervention with no direct security interdependence.
If there is no security interdependence, the regulatory
intervention yields the following responses (x†, η†)
from airports and attackers for the ith airport:
x†i = x∗i , (11)
η† = η∗. (12)
From Proposition 2, it follows that without se-
curity interdependence, the regulatory intervention
yields the same result as the Nash equilibrium and
there is no need for regulatory intervention to set
minimum security investment levels.
5.2. Equilibrium in Presence of Direct Security
Interdependence
We now investigate the effects of security inter-
dependence on the strategic behavior of airports and
attackers. As security interdependence is taken into
account, airports’ security expenditures benefit not
only themselves, but also the airports connected to
10 Kuper et al.
them. Thus, we need to consider strategic interac-
tions not only between the choices of attackers and
airports, but also between the decisions of different
types of airports.
Let 





0 i = j,
δij i = j, (13)
where δij has been introduced in Section 4 (see Ta-
ble V). Notice that I + 
 is positive semidefinite and
thus (I + 
)y = x where I is the n × n identity matrix
implies that y ≤ x.
Proposition 3 Nash equilibrium with security inter-
dependence. If there is security interdependence, the
Nash equilibrium for the network of airports and
its attackers yields the following responses (x, η)
from airports and attackers for the ith airport:
x = (I + 
)−1x∗, (14)
η = η∗. (15)
Proposition 3 indicates that the Nash equilibrium
security expenditure for airport i depends on the
expenditures of other airports but that the number
of attackers is not affected. Equations (14) and (15)
also imply that for all airports i the probability of a
successful attack will not change (σ i = σ ∗i ).
This phenomenon is consistent with the com-
munity equivalent of Kunreuther and Heal (2003)
pairwise prisoner’s dilemma: the tragedy of the com-
mons. When other people contribute to your security
you can keep your current expenditure, and thus im-
prove the overall security level or, most likely, keep
your current level of security and lower your costs.
The presence of interdependence means that targets
can benefit from the expenditures of interconnected
targets. However, they focus on their own utility
(balancing the probability of a loss with the certainty
of their own security expenditure), so that targets will
use the benefit gained by interdependence to lower
their own expenditure. As a result, the number of
attackers will not change as the overall probability
of success remains the same but targets will spend
less for security. As someone else will take care of
screening, one can avoid double screening and just
make sure screened and unscreened do not mix. As
we mentioned, this is mathematically apparent from
the fact that (I + 
)x = x∗ and therefore x ≤ x∗.
Heal and Kunreuther (2007) present a more
extreme situation where coalitions of defenders
decide to invest and other coalitions may not invest.
Such scenarios happen because their model only
offers a binary mechanism of choice (invest or not
invest) and has no explicit attacker. Hence, there
might not be a global equilibrium if the graph is
not fully connected. In contrast, not only do we
have a continuous mechanism and the choices of
the attackers also generate some interdependence
(see Massacci et al., 2017, for a discussion of how
this happens) but we always have an equilibrium
when 
 (Equation (13)) is invertible. This is the
case when the eigenvalues of the binary network are
nonzero and the graph is connected which is in our
practical scenario: you can always fly from anywhere
to anywhere else in Europe through some hops. So
we do not concern ourselves with coalitions.
Similarly to Proposition 2, optimal strategies of
airports and attackers under regulatory intervention
with security interdependence can be identified by
using Equations (7) and (5) as functions of x∗i and
η∗. Our solution strategy is to show that when we
introduce security interdependence through the
matrix 
, we can express the Nash equilibrium in
terms of the case when security is independent with
an adjustment for the dependency structure. This is
described explicitly in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Optimal strategies under regulatory
intervention with security interdependence. In the
case where there is security interdependence, the regu-
latory intervention induces the following strategies of
airports (x‡i ) and attackers (η
‡):
σ ‡ = σ ∗ 

















 log ((I + 
T)−1




 and  are, respectively, the elementwise
Hadamard product and division and 1
α
is shorthand
for 1  α = [ 1
α1
, . . . 1
αN
].
The regulatory intervention in presence of inter-
dependence has a significant impact on the attacker
strategies, as we illustrate in the next subsection. At
first, the overall number of attackers per target is
lower than with a Nash Equilibrium (η‡i ≤ η∗i ) and
the intervention of the regulator has reduced the
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probability of a successful attack with respect to the
attack probability in a Nash equilibrium (σ ‡i ≤ σ ∗i ).
However, it is not necessarily true that the security
expenditures have decreased, i.e., it might be the case






i , depending on the level of
interdependence.
5.3. Analyzing Security Interdependence
To get more insights on how security interdepen-
dence affects the strategic decisions of airports and
attackers, we compare the results of Sections 5.1 and
5.2. There are two channels for changes in security
in expenditure in airport i to affect the expected cost
in airport j. The first is directly via the matrix 
 the
first-order effect. The second is via the externality
created by the number of attackers choosing to at-
tack changing as targets adjust their security posture
and change the cost–benefit ratio for the attackers.
Imposing structural restrictions on the shape of

 can yield solutions with more tractable interpre-
tations and analysis. We first compare the difference
between the Nash equilibrium security expenditures
with and without security interdependence. Since
the entries in 
 are all nonnegative, Equation (14)
implies that x∗i ≥ xi for all i. Formally,
Corollary 1. Under security interdependence, each
airport’s Nash equilibrium level of security expendi-
ture is less than or equal to the equilibrium level of
security expenditure without interdependence.
As such, Corollary 1 indicates that, with increas-
ing security interdependence, airports are likely
to underinvest in security, relative to the social
optimum under perfect coordination. This result is
consistent with the final discussion on the size of a
minimum intervention by a regulator for interdepen-
dent airports by Heal and Kunreuther (2007) albeit
they do not have an explicit attacker. It shows the ro-
bustness of the conclusion as it comes independently
of the details of the actual mathematical formulation
(likely because the same broad assumptions are met).
Corollary 2. The probability of a successful attack
determined by Nash equilibrium is not affected by
security interdependence.
Comparing airport i’s equilibrium expected
cost with and without security interdependence,
denoted as Vi and V
∗
i respectively, gives us, from
Equation (6),
Vi = σ ∗∗i Li + xi ≤ σ ∗i Li + x∗i = V∗i for all i. (19)
This implies that, at the Nash equilibrium, the to-
tal expected cost to society with interdependence,
i Vi , is less than or equal to the total expected cost
to society without interdependence i V∗i . Therefore:
Corollary 3. At the Nash equilibrium, an airport’s
expected cost and the expected cost to society deter-
mined by (x, η) are less than or equal to those
determined by (x∗, η∗).
The regulatory intervention in presence of inter-
dependence has a significant impact on the attacker
strategies. Using the same observations on I + 
, we
conclude that σ ‡  σ ∗ ≤ 1, and therefore σ ‡i ≤ σ ∗i .
The same reasoning applies to η‡i ≤ η∗i as it is the sum
of the terms of η∗ (Equation (10)) except that each
of them is weighted by a number [(I + 
T)−11]i ≤ 1.
The intervention of the regulator has reduced the
probability of a successful attack with respect to the
attack probability in a Nash equilibrium. However, it
is not necessarily true that the security expenditures
have decreased, i.e., that x‡i < x
∗
i .
We now explore how security interdepen-
dence affects the outcomes with regulation. From
Proposition 4, Equation (18) can be rewritten as:






i for i = j. (20)
At the equilibrium, the number of attacks
per target under regulatory intervention η̂ is also
affected by security interdependence and the airport
composition (i.e., η‡ = η†). From Equation (17), we
can identify that it is indeterminable whether η‡ is
greater or less than η† since security interdependence
increases η‡ by raising 1/(1 − 
). Thus,
Corollary 4. The average number of attacks per
target under regulatory intervention with security in-
terdependence is always less than the average number
without security interdependence.
Corollary 5. The probability of a successful attack
determined by regulatory intervention with security
expenditure is less than the probability with no
security interdependence.
6. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
We illustrate numerically the theoretical results
and explore the relative magnitudes of the effects for
those cases in our policy setting. We first present the
calibration of the parameters, and then examine how
changes in a policy arrangement affecting security
interdependence influence the players’ strategies and
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the overall expected costs for both Nash equilibrium
and social optimum cases.
A generalized and comprehensive under-
standing must take precedence in order to make
quantification of the parameters used in the model.
Therefore, we first explore the features related to
airport security and then provide an example of
how the model illustrated in the previous section is
parameterized to replicate certain features of Euro-
pean airports. The main motivation of this section is
to observe different outcomes of policies where secu-
rity interdependence is present. The model considers
the Nash equilibrium solutions as a status quo and
calculates the impact of government policy and alter-
ing variables in the equilibrium such as the level of
interdependence between different types of airports.
6.1. Parameter Calibration
For presentational purposes, we divide our anal-
ysis into large and small/medium airports, a division
which is also used for terrorism studies (Jacobson,
Karnani, & Kobza, 2005; McLay et al., 2008; Virta,
Jacobson, & Kobza, 2003) to report costs and impact.
There is no universal criterion or definition
for classifying airport sizes. For example, while
the U.S. Department of Transportation uses the
total paved runway area to classify airports (Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, 2003), the U.S.
Congress uses passenger enplanements for classifi-
cation (U.S. Congress, 1984). Fig. 1 reports the data
obtained from Vitali et al. (2011) where 509 Euro-
pean airports are sorted by the number of inbound
flights per day. We consider only the airports with
a minimum of 5,000 flights per year, which amounts
to around a dozen flights per day. For example,
Ancona airport in Table IV is included. We also
obtain turnover and passenger throughput.
We also derive some of the parameter values
from formal and informal interviews with various
stakeholders (De Gramatica et al., 2015) to gauge
average annual levels of risk and the degree of loss
from a successful attack.
We consider as large airports those which have
a number of outgoing flights larger than three
median absolute deviations away from the overall
median. That is: median(Ai ) > 3 · median(|Ai −
median(Ai )|). This yields 51 large airports and
135 medium-small airports in the EU (including
the United Kingdom at the time of writing). The
distribution of those flights is reported in Fig. 1. It is
essentially a log normal distribution. A more refined
division would include mega-hubs and “moderately
large” airports. For simplicity, we scale all data (cost,
impact, losses, etc.) by dividing all traffic by the me-
dian traffic of large airports used as a reference point
which amounts to around 60,000 flights. Alternative
solutions are possible with a nonlinear scaling.
In addition, we assume that there are on av-
erage 100,000 daily passengers for a large airport
(see Table IV for an example). The passengers of
other airports are scaled according to the respective
proportion of outgoing traffic. Leveraging from
intelligence information obtained from the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
some terrorism studies (Jacobson et al., 2005; McLay
et al., 2008; Virta et al., 2003) estimate that the cost
caused by a security attack (a false clear) in an airport
can result in a loss of €1.4B. We use this value as our
proxy value for the loss from a successful attack on a
large airport. Small/medium airports are scaled simi-
larly by keeping the proportion with outgoing traffic.
Fig. 1(b) illustrates how this assumption yields
essentially two groups of airports whose losses are
exponentially distributed with a very good fit.
To identify αi from σi , recall that αi captures
the effectiveness of security investments xi . In our
scenario, the current security investment is deter-
mined by the security taxes feei paid by the outgoing
passengers, which we considered proportional to
the number of outgoing flights oi per day. From
the discussion reported in the various interviews
documented in De Gramatica et al. (2015), there is a
clear articulation that current airport regulators are
attempting to ensure that the number of incidents
expected for several years in a row (10 or more) is
close to zero. We can assume that the current level
of security investments without interdependence is
sufficient for the success of attacks to be below the
threshold even if we assume that all attacks could be
successful σbase = Ai . So if di is the number of days
without incidents we have at least
σi · oi ≤ 1di =⇒ Ai e
−αi ·Passengersi ·feei · oi ≤ 1di
=⇒ eαi ·Passengersi ·feei ≥ Ai · oi · di , (21)
which can be simplified as
αi ≥ 1Passengersi · feei
log(Ai · oi · di ). (22)
The parameters oi and Passengersi are derived from
the data that we already discussed and, as also
mentioned, there is an expectation that di ≥ 10 ∗ 365.
From the review of annual reports of various airports
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European network airport connectivity by passenger
numbers inbound (to) and outbound (from) and sorted by
eigenvalue centrality.
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Fig. 1. Structure of the European Airport Network by number of passengers.
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(a) Distribution of losses by airport.
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(b) Projected distribution of α by airport.
Fig. 2. Data used to calibrate the policy simulation.
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Fig. 3. The impact of interdependence for European airports.
Note: Red dot airports self-organize under the simultaneous Nash equilibrium when the attackers are the only mechanism for interdepen-
dency. Blue dots are airports regulated to globally optimize for interdependence. The latter benefit more in absolute value but almost the
same in percentage (range 91% vs. 90–89%) as their expenditures are already much larger.
(e.g., ACI Europe, 2010; Irish Aviation Authority &
Aviasolutions, 2004) and interviews (De Gramatica
et al., 2015), we have identified that feei is between
€5 and €7, and hence have used half of the average
value (€3) since it must be split between the arriving
and the departing airport. The results are presented
in Fig. 2(a).
The interdependence coefficient δij is the con-
tribution of the expenditures of the jth airport to
the ith airport. It is calculated by assuming that it
is composed of two factors: a fraction of the traffic
volume from the jth airport to the ith airport with re-
spect to the total traffic of the jth airport (oji/oj ), and
a security interdependence coefficient. We assume
that this interdependence coefficient is constant
(Zhuang et al., 2007) and we show what happens
when it varies globally (χ = 0.1, 0.02, 0.001). As for
the decay factor of successful attacks, β, we assume
that there is a very limited decay and set β = 0.001
(see the discussion on the context parameter in
Hausken, 2019).
Calibration of the parameter values for attackers
is difficult. A point estimate of reward/cost ratio for
attacks on type i airports, ρi , is adopted from Pym,
Williams, and Gheyas (2014), where the reward–cost
ratio for cyber attackers is 10. Another estimate
from Hausken (2019) claims that the attacker has
twice the advantage as the defender (ρi = 2).
6.2. Results of Numerical Experiments
From the identified parameter values, we can in-
vestigate how an ICT-integrated policy arrangement
that changes interdependence affects the players’
strategic decisions and the overall performance of
the airport network. Our numerical illustrations pro-
vides an overview of the intuition of this question.
For a specific operational evaluation, one would
need expert input on threat intelligence on the value
of a particular airport for the attacker and the level
of defenses currently in place (see also fig. 2 in
Hausken, 2019).
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Fig. 4. A simulated policy experiment
for European airports: Security levy
per passenger.
Fig. 3 illustrates how interdependence can
change the security expenditures at Nash Equilib-
rium. We compare the policy intervention to the
Nash equilibrium in absence of interdependence.
One can see that both types of airport will benefit
from the policy actions albeit the large airports
benefit more in absolute value.
An interesting what-if scenario happens if the
policy maker opts for a simple-to-implement policy:
mandate security expenditures in proportion to
outgoing passengers numbers. A key question is
how far is this policy from the optimal security
expenditures. In our scenario, we assumed that 

is proportional to the number of flights, so such a
scenario seems plausible. Consider the gap between
the proportional repartition of security expenditures
and the optimal level. Consider first the global
amount of per-passenger fees that should be globally
collected to achieve an optimal allocation, and then
see how this value changes in presence of increas-
ing level of interdependencies. For each of these
interdependency levels, we also consider the fee
that would be collected by large and small/medium
airports if they were to individually use their opti-
mal allocated expenditure according to the Nash
equilibrium.
Fig. 4 shows what could happen if the policy
maker were to collect all taxes per passengers in a
total that was sufficient to cover the overall security
costs, but distributed them in proportion to the
traffic. What is more important, is that the level of
security fee fixed by small airports is always below
the one fixed by the regulator for the large airports.
For different combination of parameters, we also
found out that there is a crossover point after which
the regulator asks large airports to pay less and asks
small airports to pay disproportionately more.
Finally, we consider what-if the increase in inter-
dependence is not uniformly distributed. The uniform
increase that we discussed above can be instantiated
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Fig. 5. Introducing remove virtual towers: Nonuniform increase in interdependency among European airports.
Note: Change in security expenditures due to centralizing small/medium airports towers into remote virtual towers. The small/medium
airports benefit more of interdependencies. Larger airports are also asked to contribute more as the small airports become also more
tightly knit.
for SESAR’s integrated IT system SWIM which
increases the overall security interdependence in the
airport network. The U.S. initiative NextGen has an
analogous counterpart.
A concrete case in which interdependence
increases only in small and medium airports is the
increasing deployment of airport remote and virtual
towers (RVTs). An RVT replaces a traditional, phys-
ical airport control tower by a virtual one in which
the view over the window is replaced by a number
of sensors which stream their reading to a remotely
connected location that manages several airports at
once. This cost optimization measure has been in
study for several years (SESAR, 2012) and has al-
ready started to be piloted and deployed in very small
airports (e.g., in Norway and Colorado). This mea-
sure which is likely to increase the security interde-
pendence of medium-small airports (where the RVT
will be deployed) over large airports which will still
have their own control tower. If the RVT is breached
by an attacker, it will make small airports con-
nected to the RVT inoperable. The corresponding
simulation in Fig. 5 is particularly interesting because
it shows that even if the increase in interdependence
only affects a subset of the airports, the others are
also affected: almost all large airports have to face an
increasing expenditure of several hundred thousand
euros. Small airports do not necessarily have to pay
less. As is clear from the figures some have to pay
less but others have to pay more.
In summary, these results imply that technical
or policy arrangements which increase security
interdependence not only have “functional impacts”
(e.g., cost saving) but also a major impact on the
security performance and the security financing of
the airport network.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Understanding network effects and dependen-
cies is a key issue in risk analysis. State-of-the-art
results, including this article, are always a tradeoff
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between the ability to obtain a general solution that
is easy to analyze and the choice of a functional
form for some aspect of the model. For example, the
choice of additive payoffs weighted by probability
of success for attackers started from Kunreuther
and Heal (2003) and is essentially the same in much
of the literature up to 2019 in Hausken (2019) and
this article.
The methodological contribution of this study
is twofold. First, we outline a tractable network
model which enshrines the notion of an expected
benefit maximizer seeking to optimally reduce risks
through security investment. We then illustrate
how the solved form of this model (under both a
simultaneous Nash equilibrium and a risk-neutral
social planner regulator), can be used to study policy
problems by means of simulation.
A limitation of several interdependency papers,
including this one, is that there is so far no generally
agreed procedure for measuring and empirically
assessing interdependency parameters. For exam-
ple, this procedure is specified neither in Zhuang
et al. (2007) nor in Hausken’s papers (Hausken,
2019; Hausken & He, 2016) and in several papers
mentioned in Hausken and Fe’s survey (Hausken
& Levitin, 2012). For simpler models and case
studies, e.g., case study three in Paté-Cornell et al.
(2018), some empirical validation has been pro-
posed, but the process is only sketched. In other
cases, the parameter values are drawn from expert
opinion (Haphuriwat & Bier, 2011) or the procedure
by which the data are provided is not described
due to security reasons (McLay et al., 2008). In this
article, we have tried to ground the value for our
simulation as much as possible on actual data of
interconnections from airports, using actual number
of interconnecting flights as a reasonable proxy.
When faced with the cost of mitigating risks,
those paying need to have some assurance that the
costs they face are proportional to the costs of risk
burden mitigation that are incurred because of their
actions. This basic concept of fair risk sharing under-
pins a great deal of how a global society operates.
The objective of our model is to illustrate the effect
of a network dependency structure on both security
and the cost of security in an airport setting.
In this article, we use flight data describing the
number of connections between airports to capture
the degree of interdependency. More granular data
could be used to augment this analysis by looking
at specific live connections and overlapping systems
that might not be captured by the raw passenger data.
Indeed, as far as the authors know this is one of the
very few n-player interaction games with a closed-
form solution for a general equilibrium that allows
different levels of interdependencies between actors.
The model automatically adjusts for changes in risk
caused by more aggressive and capable attackers.
We illustrate the concrete utility of the model
by simulating two policy dilemmas: first the fairness
of uniform security taxes, and then what happens in
presence of a technological investment that changes
the degree of interdependence for some airports
but not for all. We demonstrate that several im-
plicit transfers occur that result in cost externalities
impacting smaller airports that are unable to take
advantage of the economies of scale of the large
regional hubs. (In Fig. 4, the policy maker is actually
collecting a higher fee from small airport passengers
that they would otherwise collect by themselves.)
We also show that this channel of externalities can
be inverted or magnified (under differing technology
conditions) if some of the smaller airports collec-
tively virtualize and centralize airport control tower
operations into a through scheme resulting in a leap
in block dependency also for airports that should be
unaffected (see, e.g., Fig. 5).
Our general model of interdependent security in-
vestment and our simulation based on airport traffic
data demonstrates that security investment shortfalls
are heavily clustered with a substantial degree of
separation between the larger integrated regional
hubs and the smaller point to point airports. Hence
a one-size-fits-all policy may be far from optimal.
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